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Abner S. Greene† 
The state plays different roles, and free speech doctrine should 
(and sometimes does) respect these roles. We properly insist (with 
some categorical exceptions) that the state not regulate private speech 
based on subject matter or point of view. If private speakers want to 
praise the Nazis or condemn homosexuality, the state has no place 
stopping them, even if firmly convinced these ideas are wrong. Why 
we have such firm protection for speech we abhor is a matter of much 
debate. To some extent, it’s because we don’t trust the state to make 
content-based judgments consistently as a matter of principle; we fear 
that too often it will be merely playing favorites, helping friends and 
harming enemies. One thing we know is that the state holds a 
monopoly over legitimate coercive force, and that when it jails or 
fines, it possesses the ability to squelch speech, and not merely 
channel it to another outlet. 
We have similarly strict rules against the state’s drawing content-
based lines in public places where people have traditionally gathered. 
We may build streets primarily for ease of movement and parks 
primarily for recreation, but citizens also use both to meet and discuss 
matters of the day, to face ideas with which they may not be familiar 
(and sometimes find quite odd). We can always walk by or away from 
such speech, so we are never captive in these settings. Even if streets 
and parks are technically “owned” by the state and not by private 
capital, they are held as a kind of public trust. (That the state is really 
“we the people” acting via delegation can’t get us very far; exploding 
the public/private line in this sense would raise difficulties in any area 
of free speech law, regarding whether the state is acting in a 
sovereign/regulatory or some other capacity.) We have made a 
collective decision—perhaps in part to ensure that not only the 
wealthy have adequate avenues for their ideas—to reserve some 
property as space where the state may not regulate speech based on 
content. 
On the other end of the spectrum, the state sometimes speaks itself. 
Some examples are obvious and it is just as obvious that free speech 
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doctrine is out of place. So, when the President promotes his agenda 
or critiques his opponents, he may make whatever content-based 
statements he likes. Similarly, when the FDA announces warnings 
regarding a food or drug, it may say what it believes to be true, 
without giving equal time for the opposing point of view. The state, 
through these actors, may be advancing content-based, contested 
positions—even points of view—but we know there are ample 
opportunities in other fora for disagreement to be stated. Neither a 
regulatory monopoly nor state control over property held in trust for 
public gathering is involved here. 
The state also speaks for itself in more disguised ways, and we 
generally are fine with it making content-based judgments there as 
well. Often this involves conditional funding, and the conditions often 
turn on speech content. If the state wants to promote childbirth (and 
possible adoption) over abortion, it may do so, whether it is speaking 
directly (say, through an official’s speech to a group) or indirectly 
(say, through funding a clinic that agrees to follow these rules). 
Perhaps we should require that the state’s role in such selective 
funding be transparent at every level, most importantly (in this 
example) to the women receiving the health services. But such 
selective funding neither coerces private choice nor dominates the 
market for the relevant speech. (I am assuming in this example that 
abortion-related information is otherwise available to the women who 
seek clinic help. In addition to improving accountability, the 
transparency concern helps ensure that the women seeking clinic help 
appreciate they may not be getting standard, purely professional, 
medical advice, but rather are getting the state’s version; this will 
make it easier for them to appreciate that there may be other sources 
to which they must turn for other points of view.) Or consider if the 
state wants to fund the arts. It might not want to do so by lottery, but 
rather fund art it considers worthy of being backed by taxpayer 
money. This sort of judgment will inevitably involve attention to 
content. Perhaps the taxpayers want to fund only paintings of dogs or 
sunsets; or perhaps they don’t want to fund art they find disgusting. 
Determining what counts as disgusting will involve attention to 
content. But we’re talking about taxpayer dollars only; painters will 
still be able to produce, display, and sell disgusting art. 
In these ways, we permit a great deal of content-based selectivity 
when the state acts via direct speech or conditional spending, rather 
than through regulating. And the selectivity may be based on subject 
matter or on viewpoint. The former is clear. The latter seems harder, 
but is also clear. When we permit state conditional funding for “we 
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encourage you to carry your child to term” but refuse such funding 
for “here are abortion alternatives,” we are permitting a viewpoint 
distinction. When we permit a government agency to award arts 
grants only to work that is not indecent, we are permitting a set of 
case by case viewpoint distinctions. Indecency as a category isn’t 
obviously viewpoint-based, because it is in large part about taste and 
what seems disgusting or revolting. This kind of aesthetic judgment is 
hard to cubby-hole in our free speech doctrine. But if the underlying 
purpose of the limitation is to refuse taxpayer dollars for art that 
challenges mainstream sensibility via certain types of sexual images 
or images related to bodily functions, that desire to preserve 
mainstream values is similar to what happens when we fund a 
preferred viewpoint on a contested issue over another. 
That we permit content-based selectivity when the state acts as 
funder has nothing to do with the limited amount of funds available. 
We could insist on a lottery. We permit it because we want the state, 
acting in our name, to endorse some speech as good and refuse to 
give its endorsement to other speech. We don’t live in the type of 
liberal democracy that would be strictly neutral (if such a thing were 
possible) as to the good. Because we insist on strict rules for 
regulation of private speech and for certain types of state-owned 
property (streets and parks), we can preserve a robust, freewheeling 
speech marketplace in many arenas. The state as speaker and sponsor 
or patron of speech can act as the collective voice of the citizens. (I’m 
assuming a reductionist view of what we want, via a reductionist view 
of how majoritarian democracy works.) We get the best of both 
worlds—the world of public debate unfettered by the state and the 
world of state-sponsored speech that pushes some and not other views 
of the good. 
That the state may be selectively advancing a contested view of the 
good does not entail that it is adopting the speech as its own, nor that 
it is correct to attribute the speech to the state. Artists who receive 
National Endowment for the Arts grants are not necessarily advancing 
the view of the U.S. government; all we know is they are speaking 
within the range of acceptable taxpayer-funded ideas. And what about 
privately donated monuments that a municipality chooses to erect in a 
city park? It’s one thing to say when a private homeowner erects a 
monument on her lawn, she expects viewers to attribute the speech to 
her, and they are likely to do so. This isn’t true for monuments on 
city-owned property. It all depends on local understandings, perhaps 
developed over time. Maybe the town park used to be a graveyard for 
a rich family, and their old tombstones are still up. Maybe the town 
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park has a history of rotating monuments, placed via lottery. Maybe it 
has a limited number of monuments, which have gone up in fits and 
starts over the years. Even in the latter case, it seems unlikely that the 
average passerby (with or without knowledge of local history) will 
attribute the content of the monument to the city. Here’s a better way 
to look at it: The city wants to provide a platform for some ideas and 
not others. It’s not regulating, and it’s not setting rules for transient 
speech in the park. It wants to be able to erect a Rotary Club 
monument and not erect a Nazi Skinhead Club monument. We should 
treat this no differently from how we treat the state’s funding the 
National Endowment for Democracy but refusing to fund a National 
Endowment for Totalitarian Dictatorship, although the Endowment 
example may properly be one of government speech, whereas the 
Club example is better termed one of providing a platform for private 
speech. When we let the state make content-based judgments in these 
settings—even viewpoint-based judgments—the state, acting as 
sponsor or patron of private speech, is selectively shaping the content 
of what may be transmitted from state-provided speech platforms. 
Some of the messages will seem bland and pablum-like (who could 
disagree with a monument to the longtime coach of the multi-
championship high school football team?) but sometimes not (say, a 
monument to a certain war, in a town with many pacifists who oppose 
war generally and many non-pacifists who opposed this specific war). 
Again, the state isn’t preventing opposing views from being 
vigorously aired. 
If the state opens a new park, it has to play by the rules of parks 
generally, i.e., no content-based speech regulation. Analogues to 
parks should be treated similarly. Although it’s a bit of a harder 
question, if the state opens a municipal auditorium with an all-comers 
policy, the all-comers may (and must) include groups many of us find 
odious (so long as they play by content-neutral time, place, and 
manner rules). But this gets significantly harder if we alter a few 
facts—what if the state is acting as a public university, and 
administering student activity fees for student publications? Should 
we permit the state no content-based leeway? (I put aside obvious 
permissible distinctions such as “student groups only.”) For example, 
if the establishment clause is properly read to permit state funding for 
student religious speech (so long as funds go to secular speech as 
well), then there is no good reason to forbid funds for such 
publications. (The concern that the state might be perceived as 
endorsing the religious views disappears as both a constitutional and 
policy matter once we determine that a reasonable viewer should see 
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the state as setting up a platform for private speech of various kinds, 
neither endorsing nor condemning any of it.) But does that mean the 
university must authorize funds for the We Hate Black People 
magazine? Why? Because we think that idea may be a good one, and 
needs its space in the marketplace of ideas? Because we are afraid 
that if we permit the school to draw this line, we will have to allow it 
total discretion? Once we are past the basic contours of streets and 
parks, we should permit the state to make content-based restrictions 
when it makes available speech platforms—via space or funding—if 
there are good reasons to do so. Now, you might say: Isn’t a core 
concern of free speech doctrine that the state can’t make (or should be 
disabled from making) reasoned judgments regarding speech content 
(whether acting in its initial policymaking mode or its judicial review 
mode)? And I’d say: In part that’s true, and that’s why we cordon off 
regulation of private speech and some public property in this way. 
But otherwise, we want the state to make judgments of what’s good 
and bad. Sometimes the state will be speaking when so doing; other 
times it will be providing (or not) a platform for private speech. 
There are many good reasons for the state to open speech 
platforms while imposing content-based limits. The platforms in 
question here may be numerous—the public college student 
publications I mentioned above, ads on public buses and subways, 
vanity license plates, adopt-a-highway signs, and others. So, for 
example, perhaps the state wants to permit advertising for various 
products and services in its subways and buses, but avoid potential 
controversy from permitting candidate advertising for political office. 
True, political speech generally is more highly valued than other 
speech; but here we’d be permitting all the private political speech 
(and streets/parks political speech) that the candidates can muster. 
What we’d be saying is that it’s a legitimate concern that the average 
bus rider might mistakenly think the state is endorsing a candidate 
whose sign is up (when another’s isn’t). Or that it’s a legitimate 
concern that better-funded candidates will find a kind of captive 
audience (especially among those citizens who for various reasons 
have to take public transportation). How about a state-run candidate 
forum, limited to candidates who are currently polling above a certain 
percentage? If the justification is that debates work better with a small 
number of candidates on stage (and isn’t simply a clever way for 
those in power to favor their friends), then we should permit the 
limitation. 
The state should also have the power to refuse to open platforms to 
speech that offends core, commonly held values grounded in our 
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commitment to equal protection of the laws. Examples here could 
include: no vanity license plates that disparage persons on the basis of 
race and other protected characteristics; no funding for student groups 
that do the same; refusal to allow the KKK to adopt a section of the 
highway and say so on a highway sign. Although the state has an 
interest in avoiding having such speech misattributed to it, the 
concern is not (or not primarily) about misattribution. Rather, the 
state’s primary concern is to set up speech platforms without 
providing the opportunity for some persons or groups to cause 
message-based harm to other persons or groups based on race, 
ethnicity, national origin, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or other 
characteristics on the basis of which we think it proper to offer people 
protection. 
That there are good reasons to refuse platforms for hate speech—
whether the speech itself reads as hateful or whether the group itself 
is understood as adopting principles of hate or disparagement—is 
indisputable. Core free speech doctrine nonetheless protects hate 
speech in part to ensure an open marketplace for the exchange of 
ideas; this may provide a peaceful outlet for odious ideas and may 
allow such ideas to be proven false. There are also arguments based in 
democratic theory or individual autonomy. But we can protect those 
underlying free speech values by permitting hateful, disparaging 
speech by private actors on their own turf and nickel, and by offering 
them the turf of streets and parks as common meeting grounds. 
Having done so, we can cordon off other state-provided speech 
platforms from such speech—as an extension of the idea that the 
government itself may be content-selective in its own speech. 
Refusing platforms to speech the state deems offensive to core values 
of equality will require it to draw some tricky lines, based on the 
viewpoint of the message or the group. For example, the state might 
prevent a subway ad that says “Jews Are Horrible People” but permit 
one that preaches tolerance for all religions. These are clearly 
viewpoint-based judgments that we refuse the state when it regulates 
private speech or when it administers streets and parks. In part we do 
so because we don’t want the state skewing the discourse; in part 
because we don’t think the state can draw clear lines in these settings, 
or can draw lines without playing favorites in a way that serves no 
valid public purpose. My proposal is that we should run these risks 
for state-created speech platforms in a way we refuse to run them 
when the state regulates private speech or administers streets and 
parks. The values the state is protecting are significant, and ought to 
have an arena of private speech in which they prevail. 
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The same arguments should hold for sexual or vulgar speech. Here 
the viewpoint-discrimination concern is less, because it’s less clear 
that refusing to permit a “FUCK YOU” vanity license plate or a Porn 
Club at the local high school is a viewpoint-based judgment. But 
whether it is or not, sexual or vulgar speech—although protected in 
the private and streets/parks arenas—is sufficiently offensive to most 
people that the state should be allowed to protect such sensibilities by 
not offering new speech opportunities for the offense. 
I am not suggesting, though, that we should permit the state to 
make viewpoint-based distinctions of any sort whatsoever when it 
sets up speech platforms. In particular, it may not open a platform for 
one side only in a currently contested matter. This is so even if it may 
use its own speech to promote one side over another. So, although it 
may promote childbirth over abortion, it may not permit a “RIGHT-
TO-LIFE” vanity license plate while refusing the “PRO-CHOICE” 
plate. Although it may spend money promoting climate change 
legislation, it may not permit the student environmental club to meet 
after hours while refusing to permit a club to meet that denies human 
agency in increased carbon emissions. And so on. Here is where the 
distinction between government speech and state-provided speech 
platforms matters. If the state is willing to claim speech as its own, 
then it may participate in debate without giving equal time to the 
other side. But if it is merely setting up platforms for private speech, 
then it forfeits the government speech mantle, and its reasons for 
making viewpoint distinctions change. To provide a speech platform 
for one side but not the other in a current debate should be seen as 
improper skewing of the speech marketplace. To provide a speech 
platform for the religious tolerance group but not the group that hates 
a specific sect also skews debate, but we should deem protection 
against disparagement a trumping value, at least in the setting of 
state-provided speech platforms. 
The state should, though, be permitted to exclude all sides of a 
currently contested controversy, i.e., to make subject-matter rather 
than viewpoint distinctions in these settings. So although it may not 
permit only one or the other vanity license plate in the abortion 
controversy, it may refuse to authorize vanity plates on the entire 
issue. The legitimate state interest isn’t avoiding improper attribution 
of one message or another to the state, and it’s not refusing to provide 
a platform for hateful or vulgar messages. Rather, it’s the (somewhat 
weaker) state interest in shunting debate on controversial issues to the 
private or streets/parks arenas, and keeping other state-provided 
speech platforms for more mainstream, uncontested matters. There’s 
 2/1/2011 2:12:00 PM 
1260 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:4 
a close analogy to the state’s power as sponsor or patron of private 
speech to track mainstream taxpayer sensibility and avoid 
controversy. (For what it’s worth, although I would encourage the 
state to refuse platforms for hate speech and vulgarity, I don’t have a 
strong feeling regarding whether the state should refuse platforms for 
controversial subject matter. My argument above is that such refusal 
should be considered constitutional.) 
The Court’s opinions on religious speech in schools, when the 
state has opened space for speech and then refused it for religious 
speech, are consistent with my approach. To some extent, the state 
actors in question just had a misguided view of the establishment 
clause. They thought that if a school permits a religious study or 
worship group into a space otherwise opened for speech, then the 
state might be unconstitutionally advancing or endorsing religion. But 
it wouldn’t be, for it would be correct to see the state not as 
promoting the religious views in question (although one could 
imagine a case in which that would be true, and thus constitutionally 
problematic), but rather as providing a platform for religious speech 
on equal terms with other speech. And there’s no good reason not to 
provide such a platform; religious speech, as such, is a core part of the 
U.S. fabric, and the state has no legitimate argument against it based 
on content. It would be a mistake to read this line of cases, however, 
as extending to a broader, content-neutral rule for how the state must 
manage platforms it creates for private speech. The doctrine says the 
state may make reasonable content-based decisions here; that fits my 
argument. It also says the state may not make viewpoint-based 
decisions here; that doesn’t fit my argument. But apart from the 
religion setting, there are no Court holdings (as opposed to dicta) to 
the contrary of my position permitting some viewpoint-based 
distinctions in state-created speech platforms (again, treating 
separately streets/parks and perhaps some close analogues). True, in 
most of the religious speech cases, the Court viewed the restriction on 
such speech in the public school/college setting as viewpoint-based, 
and thus invalid. But the better argument is that the restrictions on 
religious speech—better put, the refusal to provide a platform for 
religious speech—had no good justification. That they were 
viewpoint-based was a red herring, not the real reason they were 
invalid; or put another way, they were illegitimately viewpoint-based, 
leaving open the possibility of legitimate viewpoint-based distinctions 
in this setting. This line of cases doesn’t hold that once a school opens 
after-school classroom space, an auditorium, or student activities 
money for some speech, then it must open it for all speech on a 
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viewpoint-neutral basis. That is, there is no holding that says the 
school has to permit the “We Hate Black People” or “Nazi Party” 
group to have equal access. 
Let’s turn, finally, to antidiscrimination norms in the setting of 
state-created speech platforms. The state may not itself disparage 
people based on race (put aside whether one would have a cause of 
action for such disparagement). And it may not sponsor speech that 
does so. A more limited version of this argument would suggest that, 
at least, the state may choose to not so disparage persons, and may 
choose to not provide platforms for such disparagement. Thus, if a 
state law school chooses to provide meeting space and activities funds 
for student groups generally, but not for groups that espouse hatred of 
persons based on race, the law school is acting according to a 
legitimate public purpose. It shouldn’t matter if the protected 
characteristic has been deemed to trigger strict or intermediate 
scrutiny; those are rules for limiting judicial review of legislative 
action, and not rules that should bind the policy maker itself. If there 
is a good reason (yes, we will have to judge it) for deeming a 
trait/characteristic in need of state protection, then that is a good 
reason for the state to refuse a platform for disparaging speech on the 
basis of such a characteristic. Thus, a state law school may refuse a 
platform for antigay speech, even if sexual orientation has not (yet) 
been treated with elevated scrutiny by the Court. I note again that 
private speech may not be regulated on this basis. 
What about regulation of associations based not on their speech 
but on their exclusionary decisions based on certain characteristics, 
say, sexual orientation? A state law school must permit a group—say, 
a religious one that has a negative view about homosexuality—to 
exist and its members to associate, even if that involves exclusion 
from membership and/or leadership to gays and lesbians. This rule is 
but an offshoot of our freedom of association rules generally—the 
state may not insist that such groups change their internal practices. 
But if the state is providing speech and associational opportunities—
say, activities funds or announcements in the school’s weekly 
newsletter or bulletin board space or a school e-mail address or 
meeting space or use of the school’s name and logo—then it may 
choose to advance the view of the good it (justifiably, if not 
necessarily) believes to be true, and refuse these platforms to groups 
that do not treat gays and lesbians equally. Is this viewpoint 
discrimination? That’s a hard question. If the school refused to permit 
the group to speak its views regarding homosexuality, that would be 
viewpoint discrimination, and illegitimate (as regulation of private 
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speech). If it refused to sponsor such views as part of a general 
opening of space or funds, that would also be viewpoint 
discrimination, but justifiable, as I argued above. If it refuses to 
sponsor groups on the ground that such groups have exclusionary 
membership/leadership rules based on sexual orientation, that might 
not properly be considered viewpoint discrimination, because it’s 
based on conduct, not on speech. But whether or not we properly 
deem the school’s decision one based on viewpoint, it’s defensible 
(and constitutional) because (a) it doesn’t regulate private speech or 
association, and (b) it advances a legitimate (although contested) view 
of the good, namely, the equality of persons regardless of sexual 
orientation. Other public law schools might take a different view, 
permitting space and funds for groups (religious or otherwise) that 
don’t support the equality of gays and lesbians. Unless we consider 
the equal protection argument to be of the strong version, forbidding 
the state from sponsoring such groups, we should deem the matter 
optional, for each school to make its own determination about the 




Here is what I have argued in this essay: The state acts in many 
different ways. Sometimes it seeks to create platforms for private 
speech. Acting in this capacity, the state is neither regulating private 
speech nor speaking itself. Nor is it administering traditional places 
for people to gather, associate, and speak such as streets and parks. 
The state has good reasons for refusing to provide speech platforms 
for hateful or vulgar speech. This is not about the fear of improper 
attribution of such messages to the state. Rather, the state’s interests 
are protecting persons from the sting of hateful speech based on 
characteristics we consider morally and politically irrelevant, such as 
race, and, to a lesser extent, protecting persons from the sting of 
vulgar or sexually indecent speech. These are values we forbid the 
state from advancing via regulation of private speech. But just as the 
state may advance these values through its own speech, so may it 
advance them via selective exclusion from state-created speech 
platforms. The risk of favoritism and unprincipled line-drawing—a 
key reason to insist on strong free speech protection when the state is 
regulating or administering streets and parks—should take a back seat 
to the protection of core, commonly held values when the state is 
setting up and administering new opportunities for private speech.1 
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